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Abstract The way we grow and consume food is changing both landscapes and societies globally.
The constraints and challenges we face in meeting the anticipated large increase in global food 
demand out to 2050 are examined to show that while they present significant difficulties on many 
fronts, we have a large range of choices in the way this food demand might be met. Meeting this 
future food demand has frequently been articulated as a crisis of supply alone by some dominant 
institutions and individuals with prior ideological commitments to a particular framing of the food 
security issue. Our analysis indicates that the crisis can be avoided by the choices we make. The food 
security debate will be enriched by a rigorous evaluation of all these choices and recognition that the 
eventual solution will reside in a mixture of these choices. We could shift from our current paradigm 
of productivity enhancement while reducing environmental impacts, to a paradigm where ecological 
sustainability constitutes the entry point for all agricultural development. If we embraced this new 
paradigm, sustainable governance and management of ecosystems, natural resources and earth 
system processes at large, could provide the framework for practical solutions towards an 
intensification of agriculture. Such a paradigm shift could reposition world food production from its 
current role as the world’s single largest driver of global environmental change, to becoming a 
critical part of a world transition to work within the boundaries of the safe operating space for 
humanity with respect to the planet’s biophysical processes and functions.  
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12571-015-0441-1
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1. Introduction
The way we grow and consume food is changing both landscapes and societies globally. Agricultural 
intensification has dramatically increased in recent decades and it has outstripped rates of 
agricultural expansion (Foley et al., 2011). The intensification of agriculture has the potential to be 
both a blessing and curse, depending on how it is done and who you ask. This paper focuses on food 
production in the context of better understanding food security means in terms of the challenges 
faced in agricultural landscapes. We acknowledge that food production is only one component of 
the food security challenge. In recent years, the focus of many researchers, commentators and 
policy makers has been on the physical availability of food, facilitated by sufficient agricultural 
production.  This has partly been fuelled by the widespread repetition of the claim that we need to 
increase global food production by 70-100% in order to feed the world in 2050. These figures, and 
the framing of food security as an agricultural productivity challenge, has been widely critiqued – not 
least by the authors of the original source of the statistics (see Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). 
They go so far as to say that food security is only weakly linked to the capacity of the world as a 
whole to produce food, “to the point of becoming nearly irrelevant” (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 
2012). Godfray & Garnett (2014) observe that the goal of producing more food is “unthinkingly 
accepted by some and vigorously contested by others”.  Meanwhile Tomlinson (2014) concludes 
“these statistics are a key discursive device used by dominant institutions and individuals with prior 
ideological commitments to a particular framing of the food security issue.” However, as Tomlinson 
acknowledges, there have been social, institutional, scientific, and political challenges to this framing 
and the articulation of an alternative set of discourses around concepts of ecological food provision, 
food sovereignty, and agro-ecology.  We accept the FAO definition that “food security exists when all 
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that 
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. That is, both 
availability and access (physical and economic) are important. Here, we focus on availability, whilst 
retaining consideration of access and consumption where possible.  
2. How much food do we need to produce?
In terms of food availability, the world average per capita availability of food for direct human 
consumption improved to 2,770 kcal/person/day in 2005/2007. However, approximately 870 million 
people were still estimated to have been undernourished (in terms of dietary energy supply) in the 
period 2010–12. This figure represents 12.5 percent of the global population, or one in eight people. 
The vast majority of these, 852 million, live in developing countries, where the prevalence of 
undernourishment is now estimated at 14.9 percent of the population (FAO et al., 2012). 
Micronutrient deficiencies continue to affect around 2 billion people (FAO et al., 2012). More than 
100 million children under the age of five are underweight, and therefore unable to realize their full 
socio-economic and human potential. Childhood malnutrition is a cause of death for more than 2.5 
million children every year (FAO et al., 2012).  
While food availability (i.e. crop production) is necessary for access to healthy, safe, and nutritious 
food, it is not sufficient to ensure food security. Food access is also required.  The caloric content of 
the food produced worldwide would be sufficient to feed the whole global population - yet there are 
still countries in conditions of chronic food scarcity. South Asia has the largest number of food 
insecure people, while Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion, as well as the highest rates of 
child underweight and infant and child mortality (FAO et al., 2012). About 33% of people in Sub-
3 
Saharan Africa are undernourished, with more than 60% of the undernourished being in eastern 
Africa (Khan et al., 2014). The majority of countries whose population growth is expected to be fast 
in the future are precisely those showing inadequate food consumption and high levels of 
undernourishment. Most of them are in sub-Saharan Africa (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012).  
In terms of food demand, the projected global growth rate in consumption is 1.1 percent per year 
from 2005/07-2050 (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012) which implies a 56 % increase  over the period. 
Others such as Tilman et al., (2011) however forecast of a 100–110% (requiring a 1.4 to 1.5 percent 
per year growth rate) increase in global crop production using a global relationship between per 
capita GDP and per capita demand for crop calories or protein. The magnitude of this dependence is 
surprisingly large in that per capita use of calories and protein by the richest nations 
(GDP~US$20,000) were 256% and 430% greater, respectively, than use by the poorest nations (GDP 
~US$2,000). These large differences in crop demand partially result from greater dietary meat 
consumption at higher income and the low efficiency with which some types of livestock convert 
crop calories and protein into edible foods. Therefore per capita food consumption can be expected 
to expand most rapidly in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America where incomes are rising and 
population growth is slowing. Vegetable oils, sugar, meat and dairy products should experience the 
highest increases in demand (OECD-FAO, 2011). More recent very detailed work by Valin et al., 
(2014) examines the nature of food demand under the influences of population growth, economic 
wealth distribution and dietary change. For a world population of 9.3 billion by 2050 and more than 
a doubling in average income per capita globally, from 6,700 USD in 2005 to 16,000 USD in 2050, 
generates a food demand increase of 59–98% between 2005 and 2050. This is slightly higher than 
the most recent FAO projection of 56% from 2005/2007. The range of results is large, in particular 
for animal calories (between 61% and 144%), caused by differences in demand systems 
specifications, and in income and price elasticities. Their results show importantly that demand is 
more sensitive to socioeconomic assumptions than to climate change or bioenergy scenarios. 
In terms of the growth in agricultural production, to match the 1.1% growth in consumption, global 
production in 2050 would need to be approximately 60 percent higher than that of 2005/2007 
(Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). Fischer, et al., (2014) provides an comprehensive analysis of crop 
yield improvements and suggests that it would be prudent to have crop yield increases per annum of 
around 1.2 -1.3% which delivers around a 45% increase in stables over 2010 yields with a 10% 
increase in area cropped.  As Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012) note, this is not a reflection of what 
is required to feed the world population but a projection of the aggregate volume of world 
agricultural production. This means that productivity would need to increase at rates much lower 
than in the past. This is because total agricultural output in the preceding equal period was 2.2 
percent pa (and 2.6% in the previous decade OCED-FAO, 2011), much less than the required 1.1 
percent p.a. from 2005/2007 to 2050. Currently, for 2010-2020, global agricultural production is 
projected to grow at 1.7% annually, on average (OECD-FAO, 2011). This is within the margin needed. 
While the need for lower growth rates is reassuring, the challenge is still significant, not least 
because of the projected reduction in annual growth rates of yields. There are fears that the trend in 
declining yields may not reverse and that the productivity of many intensive systems cannot be 
maintained with current management (World Bank, 2008; Khan & Hanjra, 2009; Alexandratos & 
Bruinsma, 2012).  In addition, it is predicted that up to 25% of world food production may be lost 
during the 21st century due to climate change, water scarcity, invasive pests and land degradation 
(UNEP, 2009).  Even at a lower growth rate, the volumes are not trivial. Cereals production would 
need to increase by 940 million tonnes to reach 3 billion tonnes projected for 2050; meat by 196 
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million tonnes to reach 455 million tonnes by 2050; and oil crops by 133 million tonnes to reach 282 
million tonnes (oil equivalent) by 2050 (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012).  
At a global level, while there are risks associate with falling growth rates of global average yields, this 
is not necessarily indication of an impending crisis. However, as with many things on this earth, 
productivity is not distributed evenly. At a local level, falling growth rates can lead to tragedy 
(Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). In this case, concern is greatest for sub-Saharan Africa where per 
capita food production has seen an annual decline of at least 3% in per capita food production since 
1990. 
3. Are there limits to food production?
Given lower productivity growth rates, ongoing soil and water degradation and the loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services in agricultural landscapes, the big challenge is to maintain 
current levels of productivity growth, let alone seek increases. The question is, will this be possible? 
Based on the information reviewed below, we can say that, in theory, there are enough natural 
resources and yield growth potential to meet requirements. Although this is no guarantee of the 
long-term sustainability of food production in practice.  
We have enough nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus. From the 1960s and 70s, as is widely 
document, the green revolution turned developments in crop genetics, inexpensive pesticides and 
fertilizers, and mechanization into greater yields (Tilman, 1998).  From the 1950s, global fertilizer use 
rapidly expanded, increasing by 500% in the past 50 years. At the same time, the production of 
pesticides increased by more than 850% (Balmford et al., 2005; Foley et al., 2011). Industrial 
agriculture is increasingly reliant on external inputs. It now takes 2-3 times more fertilisers and 1.5 
time mores pesticides to produce 1 kilogram of food than it did 40 years ago (UNCTAD, 2010). Key 
biophysical drivers of crop yield include nitrogen (N), phosphate (P2O5) and potash (K2O) fertilizers 
(Mueller et al., 2012). The world has enough potassium to last several centuries (Vaccari, 2009). And 
with the Haber-Bosch process, N fertilizer can be produced without limits from atmospheric N2 – 
although at a serious fossil fuel and climate change cost. However Rockström et al., (2009), point out 
that at the “planetary scale, the additional amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus activated by 
humans are now so large that they significantly perturb the global cycles of these two important 
elements”. The manufacture of fertilizer for food production and the cultivation of leguminous crops 
convert around 120 million tonnes of N2 from the atmosphere per year into reactive forms is more 
than the combined effects from all Earth’s terrestrial processes (Sayer & Cassman, 2013). Much of 
this new reactive nitrogen ends up in the environment, polluting waterways and the coastal zone, 
accumulating in land systems and adding a number of gases to the atmosphere. It slowly erodes the 
resilience of important Earth subsystems. Nitrous oxide, for example, is one of the most important 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases and thus directly increases radiative forcing. 
In contrast to the N cycle, the phosphorus (P) cycle has no gaseous atmospheric component. A key 
component of DNA, cell membranes and cellular energy transport, phosphorus is essential to every 
form of life. Yet most soils contain only low concentrations of this nutrient (Obersteiner et al., 2013). 
As is well known, the growing consumption of inorganic phosphorus (P) fertilizers has contributed to 
major increases in crop yields since the 1950s (MacDonald et al., 2011). For example, Ringeval et al 
(2014) found that the contribution of anthropogenic P to food production  France was as high as 
84%. In the United States, crop production would decline at least around 50% over time without N, 
P, and K commercial fertilizer (Ringeval et al., 2014). P mined from phosphate rock is a finite fossil 
resource with highly concentrated deposits  - more so that for oil reserves (Vaccari, 2009). Morocco 
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is estimated to hold 85% of the global share, followed by China with 6% and the US with 3% 
(MacDonald et al., 2011; Obersteiner et al., 2013). Twenty three megatons of P (equivalent to 178.5 
Mt of phosphate rock) are currently mined every year, mainly from these three countries 
(MacDonald et al., 2011; Ringeval et al., 2014). 
Fertiliser use varies greatly between different parts of the world. Total fertilizer nutrient 
consumption in Asia is 58.7 per cent of the world total, the bulk of which is in East Asia and South 
Asia. The total for America is 23.7 per cent, of which North America constitutes 13.2 percent and 
Latin America & Caribbean 10.5 percent.  Europe’s share in global consumption of total fertilizer 
nutrients is about 13 percent. The share of Oceania in world consumption of total fertilizer nutrients 
is only 1.7 per cent (including Australia and New Zealand) – the same as for North Africa (FAO, 2012).  
This unequal distribution means that only 10% of cropland area contributes 45% of the cumulative 
global P surplus. These large surpluses cover most of East Asia, as well as sizeable tracts of Western 
and Southern Europe, the coastal United States, and southern Brazil, but <2% of the cropland in 
Africa (MacDonald et al., 2011). These soils are saturated with P because of historically high 
applications (Cordell & White, 2011). Meanwhile, P deficits occur across 30% of the world’s cropland 
area. Prolonged P deficits that can deplete soil P and limit crop yields (MacDonald et al., 2011). In 
general, the low-income and food-deficient countries in sub-Saharan Africa, central Asia and Latin 
America suffer from low P inputs (0–5 kg ha−1) to their agricultural production systems (this pattern 
is also true for other crops, alongside wheat). Perversely, Africa is a major exporter of phosphate and 
nitrogen but only accounts for about 2.9 percent of world fertilizer consumption (FAO, 2012).  
Estimates of when existing P reserves could be exhausted range from the next 40 to 400 years 
(Cordell & White, 2011; Elser & Bennett, 2011; Obersteiner et al., 2013). P scarcity would seriously 
threaten soil fertility, agricultural production, and global food security (Cordell & White, 2011; 
Ringeval et al., 2014). However, there is potential to manage this scarcity. Up to 80% of the 
phosphorus supplied to crops is estimated to be lost before consumption, largely due to the erosion 
of agricultural soils (Cordell & White, 2011; Obersteiner et al., 2013). Reductions in wastage could 
free up this resource for low-income, food-deficient countries (Obersteiner et al., 2013). At a global 
scale, if current volumes of P-fertilizer used more efficiently and redistributed, there would be no P 
deficit cropland. If a 21% reduction in P fertilizer use in all locations with high surpluses was 
redistributed across all P-deficit cropland, it would effectively meet the total crop P requirements in 
these locations, eliminating all P deficits globally (MacDonald et al., 2011). Mueller et al. (2012) also 
suggest it would be possible to close global yield gaps on major cereals to within 75% of attainable 
yields with fairly minimal changes to total worldwide nitrogen and phosphate use by coupling 
targeted intensification with efforts to reduce nutrient imbalances and inefficiencies. It is also worth 
remembering that total N and P in animal manure generated by livestock production exceeds the 
global N and P fertilizer use in global crop production (Bouwman et al., 2013). Achieving more 
effective manure P recycling at the global scale would  promote tighter P cycling in agricultural 
landscapes (MacDonald et al., 2011). 
The bigger challenge is nutrient imbalance. Global food security must address the dual challenges 
of closing yield gaps between actual and potential yield (which is largely about management of soil 
nutrient balance) while improving environmental sustainability. Nutrient balance is essential for 
achieving global food security (Ciampitti & Vyn T., 2014). The global spatial imbalance of fertilizer 
consumption in large parts of the developing world, particularly Africa, is compounded by an 
increasingly unsustainable regional nutrient consumption ratio (van der Velde et al., 2014). The 
availability of carbon from rising atmospheric carbon dioxide levels and of nitrogen from various 
human-induced inputs to ecosystems is continuously increasing. However, this is not being matched 
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by similar increases in P inputs (Peñuelas et al., 2013). Unbalanced application of N versus P 
applications cause yield deficits by affecting the stoichiometric relationship between N and P in plant 
leaves (van der Velde et al., 2014). The change in the stoichiometry of carbon and nitrogen relative 
to phosphorus has no equivalent in Earth’s history (Peñuelas et al., 2013). 
In Africa, total N consumption increased by 120% between 1975 and 2005 while total phosphate 
consumption only increased by 16% in 2005 (van der Velde et al., 2014).  If this increasing imbalance 
is not reversed, then significant reductions in future crop yields (>40%) could also occur (van der 
Velde et al., 2014).  Based on simulated maize yields, van der Velde et al.  (2014) estimated N inputs 
would need to increase 5-fold to allow Africa to close yield gaps (ca. 70%). This would require an 
associated 11.7-fold increase in P (van der Velde et al., 2014). The P demand to overcome these 
yield deficits would provide a significant additional pressure on current global extraction of P 
resources (van der Velde et al., 2014). As described above, this demand could be managed, if P was 
distributed more evenly and new reserves became economically viable. 
The area of irrigated agriculture will continue to grow. Food production requires more water than 
any other human activity – even more so for irrigated than rainfed lands (D'Odorico et al., 2014).  In 
the past 50 years, the world’s irrigated cropland area roughly doubled, with 70% of global 
freshwater withdrawals now devoted to irrigation (Foley et al., 2011).  This is driven by the fact that 
yields on irrigated croplands are, on average, 2–3 times higher than for dryland agriculture (UNEP, 
2009).  Irrigated areas are heavily concentrated in South Asia, East Asia and parts of the United 
States (Mueller et al., 2012).  In Africa, while has been limited irrigation to date, there is the 
potential for much greater expansion. However recent work by Sullivan and Pittock (2014) suggest 
that the next generation of irrigation development in Africa must focus on achieving clear 
socioeconomic benefits sustainably through increased emphasis on greater water productivity, 
poverty reduction and institutional arrangements and incentives that drive implementation at the 
local scale. This would address a big challenge for many African regions, where the problem is not 
lack of water (particularly for Central Africa), but unpredictable and highly variable rainfall patterns 
with occurrences of dry spells every two years causing crop failure (UNEP, 2009). Demand for 
irrigated land is projected to increase by 56% in Sub-Saharan Africa (from 4.5 to 7 million ha), and 
rainfed land by 40% (from 150 to 210 million ha) (Tweeten & Thompson, 2008; UNEP, 2009). For this 
demand to be met, much greater human, institutional and financial capital would be needed to gain 
water access (Perrone & Hornberger, 2014). 
We have enough ‘spare’ agricultural land. The average amount of arable land per person fell from 
0.39 hectares in 1960 to 0.23 hectares in 2000 and 0.21 hectares in 2007 (Evans, 2010; FAO, 2009). 
However, at a  global scale, there is sufficient land that could be recruited in to agriculture - if and 
when economic, policy and institutional settings created the conditions to do so (Alexandratos & 
Bruinsma, 2012). There are 7.2 billion hectares (ha) of land with rainfed production potential of 
various degrees of suitability. Of this, 1.4 billion ha is currently in use for crop production. 2.8 billion 
ha is under forest, in protected areas, or already occupied by non-agricultural uses.  1.5 billion ha is 
of poor quality for rainfed crops, leaving 1.4 billion ha of prime land and good land that could be 
brought into cultivation, in theory (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). Clearly if this were done there 
would a huge loss of biodiversity and significant consequences for the mitigation of climate change. 
Schmitz, et al. (2014) provide analysis of two different socioeconomic scenarios and three climate 
scenarios for possible expansion of agricultural land. Across all models most of the cropland 
expansion takes place in South America and sub-Saharan Africa. As constraints in available land area 
arise, agricultural production will continue to expand into less developed areas and into marginal 
lands with lower fertility and higher risk of adverse weather events (OECD-FAO, 2011). In a recent 
 7 
 
study UNEP (2014) suggest that 1,640 Mha is safe operating space as a preliminary and indicative 
value based on a cautious global target to halt the expansion of global cropland into grasslands, 
savannahs and forests by 2020. They show that under business-as-usual conditions the net 
expansion of cropland will range from around 123 to 496 Mha between 2005 and 2050. Shifts to 
more protein-rich diets in developing countries and a growing demand for biofuels and biomaterials, 
in particular in developed countries, are especially increasing the demand for land. In addition, 
cropland will be shifted to compensate for the expansion of built-up land and land degradation, 
leading all in all to a gross expansion of cropland in the range of 320 to 849 Mha. UNEP (2014) 
propose that with major actions to reduce cropland requirements and to relieve the social and 
environmental pressures associated with land-use change,  the expansion of global cropland could 
be limited to an additional 8–37% until 2050. Then, in the best case, the remaining net expansion of 
cropland by 2050 would be within the ‘safe operating space’. 
As with most other resources, this ‘spare’ land is not evenly distributed. Many regions of the world 
face a shortage of arable land for additional cropland expansion (Morton et al., 2006). Only thirteen 
countries account for 60 percent of this 1.4 million ha. of potential agricultural land: Brazil; United 
States of America; Russian Federation; Argentina; Australia; Sudan; China; Democratic Republic of 
the Congo; Kazakhstan; Angola; Canada; Mozambique; and Madagascar (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 
2012). There is a reason this land hasn’t been used in the past, including constraints such as lack of 
accessibility, lack of infrastructure, distance from markets and from other constraints such as the 
incidence of pests and disease (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). As food demand increases, some of 
these constraints will be overcome. Further expansion of agricultural land is projected to 2050, 
particularly across central and southern Africa (UNEP, 2009). Several developing countries are 
expected to experience area increases of more than one million hectares, including Nigeria, Brazil, 
Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia and the DRC (Foresight, 2011). According to the World Bank  (2013), Africa is 
a continent that “holds more than half of the world’s unused fertile farm land, and impressive but 
untapped water resources”. They predict that agriculture and agribusiness will expand to become a 
$1 trillion industry in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 (compared to $313 billion in 2010). However the 
findings of Sullivan and Pittock (2014) are much more sanguine on the matter. 
We don’t use all the available agricultural land that we have. Of the current global crop production 
area, not all is allocated to growing human food. A significant proportion goes to animal feed, 
bioenergy, seed and other industrial products (Foley et al., 2011). By 2020, an estimated 13% of 
global coarse grain production, 15% of vegetable oil production and 30% of sugar cane production 
will be used for biofuel production (OECD-FAO, 2011). North America and Europe devote only about 
40% of their croplands to direct food production, whereas Africa and Asia allocate typically over 80% 
of their cropland to food crops (Foley et al., 2011). In addition to putting cropland to non-food 
related agricultural uses, we are also seeing existing cropland converted to other non-agricultural 
uses due to increasing urbanization, industrialization, energy demand and population growth (UNEP, 
2009).  
We don’t use all the available food that we have. Developing countries lose more than 40% of food 
post-harvest or during processing, not least due to storage and transport conditions (Lipinski et al., 
2013). Industrialized countries have lower producer losses, but at the retail and consumer level 
more than 40% of food may be wasted (PBL, 2009; Foley et al., 2011). As a global average, 24% of 
food loss and waste occurs at production, another 24% during handling and storage, and 35% at 
consumption. The amount of cropland used to grow this ‘lost food’ is approximately 198 million 
hectares per year, equivalent to an area the size of Mexico (Lipinski et al., 2013). In addition to food 
lost after harvest, significant potential food is lost during production due to pests and diseases. 
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While pesticides have made a significant contribution to growth in productivity since the 1950s, 
losses globally are still high. Oerke (2006) suggests losses of 26–29% for soyabean and wheat, and 
30–40% for maize, rice and potatoes (Beddington, 2010). This isn’t a matter of using more pesticides 
but in improving application. Only 50 per cent of the impact of crop protection products is 
accounted for by the effectiveness of the product itself; the rest is dependent on factors such as the 
timing of the application and the precision of delivery (Beddington, 2010). 
We already produce more than enough food. While under-nutrition is clearly an urgent food 
security challenge, especially for the 870 million people who suffer from it, obesity is also a serious 
problem. It affects more than 1 billion people (Lang, 2006; UNEP, 2009; Kjaergard et al., 2013; MODI, 
2013). This is especially true for developed countries United States, where obesity-related medical 
expenses are expected to top $344 billion per year by 2018 and in Australia, where obesity already 
costs an estimated $56 billion per year (MODI, 2013). In is also true for developing countries. In fact, 
80% of the deaths caused by obesity and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as diabetes and 
cancer are now occurring in low- and middle- income countries (Dube et al., 2013). We live in a 
world where the majority of the population (65%) lives in countries where overweight and obesity 
kills more people than under-nutrition (WHO, 2013). That is, obesity, under-nutrition and food 
insecurity co-exist in the same societies. The problem is likely to grow rapidly in coming years, even 
while problems of hunger and malnutrition persist  (Godfray & Garnett, 2014). 
Not all food is created equal. In developed and developing countries alike, societies are awash with 
cheap, highly processed, and nutritiously lacking “empty” calories (Carolan, 2013). For example, in 
many small island states in the Pacific Ocean, nutrition security is being threatened by changing 
tastes, a growing dependence on store foods, and the poor quality of cheap imported processed 
food and drinks – the control of which is complicated by trade agreements. In a great irony, even 
tinned fish is becoming a common import, despite being surrounded by ocean (Connell, 2013). This 
transition from subsistence agriculture to a Western-type diet is occurring in countries around the 
world (Dube et al., 2013). It is happening in the space of a few decades with little time for health 
systems to shift gears from infectious diseases to non-communicable diseases as a key cause of 
death. It is another challenge for societies that can least afford it – and while health systems bear 
the cost, the levers of change for nutrition security lie largely outside the health sector’s reach (Dube 
et al., 2013). It is a challenge that doesn’t fit neatly into the worldview or mandate of the agriculture 
and food sector (Benson, 2012).  
4. Can agriculture be sustainable? 
So, we have enough resources and the potential to produce all the food needed for the population 
of the future. Despite the long-term threats to the sustainability of agricultural landscapes, it would 
appear that there are no hard biophysical limits to producing more food – nothing to stop humans 
from using more resources, more chemicals, more land and more energy. While many of us would 
hope to see the world produce more food with limited land and water, using less energy, fertilizer 
and pesticides and with less environmental impacts (Beddington, 2010), that is not the trajectory we 
are on. If we want to take a different path, we will have to make the choice to do so. And we need to 
be clear that we do have choices – options that need to be debated rather than subsumed in a 
dialogue of crisis and food shortages. The following outlines some of the choices we could make, 
recognising that implementation of any of these choices has to be done at the national and local 




We could choose to limit agricultural expansion. Agriculture requires more land (40% of the world’s 
terrestrial surface), water and human labour than any other industry (Kiers et al., 2008; PBL, 2009). 
In the last two centuries, humans have cleared or converted 70% of the grassland, 50% of the 
savannah, 45% of the temperate deciduous forest, and 27% of the tropical forest biome for 
agriculture (Foley et al., 2011). Between 1985 and 2005 the world’s croplands and pastures 
expanded by 154 million hectares (Foley et al., 2011). Across the tropics, between 1980 and 2000 
more than 55% of new agricultural land came at the expense of intact forests, and another 28% 
came from disturbed forests (Gibbs et al., 2010). Up to 40% of this global crop area may be 
experiencing some degree of soil erosion or reduced fertility (Foley et al., 2005) while more than 
20% of total global land area is thought to be degraded (Bai et al., 2008). Much of this area is 
concentrated in Africa south of the equator, South-East Asia and south China. As a whole, it is 
estimate that over 75% of arable land in Africa being degraded as a result of continuous cropping 
with minimal or no investment in soil improvement or even maintenance (Khan et al., 2014). As 
constraints in available land area arise, agricultural production will continue to expand into less 
developed areas and into marginal lands with lower fertility and higher risk of adverse weather 
events (OECD-FAO, 2011).  
It has been suggested that the best way to minimise the expansion of new cropland is by increasing 
the productivity of existing cropland. This concept is referred to as the Borlaug (land sparing due to 
agricultural innovation) hypothesis. While some land sparing has occurred due to the Green 
Revolution in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, it is less clear that this would be the case of a 
prospective African Green Revolution (Hertel et al., 2014). This is not to imply that there shouldn’t 
be a Green Revolution in Africa, but that the context is different and the likely trajectory will not be a 
repeat of the past. There are also new drivers for agricultural expansion beyond national borders. 
The purchase of quality agricultural land by foreign actors is increasing, particularly in Africa and 
Asia. In 2009, approximately 56 million hectares worth of large-scale farmland deals were 
announced (although not all announced deals proceeded) (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). Hertel et al. 
(2014) suggest that measures to discourage conversion of carbon-rich ecosystems to low-yielding 
crop production will help to boost environmental efficiencies in the region and limit the 
environmental and climate change impacts of expansion. 
We could encourage new crops and greater genetic diversity. Greater specialisation and 
homogenisation of agricultural systems is contributing to the loss of diversity at a local level. About 
75% of the genetic diversity of agricultural crops has been lost since 1900 while 32% of livestock 
breeds are under threat of extinction within the next 20 years (FAO, 2009). This is to say nothing of 
the more than 4000 plant and animal species threatened with extinction by agricultural 
intensification (UNEP, 2009). We need to breed for a 2030 world (GSCSA, 2011). This requires 
increasing crop and livestock genetic diversity to improve resilience, yield and pest management. 
There also needs to be a valuing of informal seeds systems to facilitate the exchange of plant genetic 
resources at local scales (FAO, 2014). Africa has huge diversity of cropping systems, and many 
orphan crops are central to food security. These crops should not be overlooked in the mad rush to 
grow more hectares of maize. Interventions focus on strengthening the formal agricultural systems 
(such as maize) at the expense of local informal systems threatens to undermine the sources of 
diversity from which people in different localities need to draw if they are the build livelihoods that 
are resilient to shocks and long-term stresses (Westley et al., 2011). This is because policies that 
promoted staple crop production, such as fertilizer and credit subsidies, price supports, and 
irrigation infrastructure can crowd out the production of traditional non-staple crops (Pingali, 2012). 
Many solutions to the crops for food have been proffered, but most are from limited perspectives 
and often represent vested interests of some sort—economic, political, or academic (Gready, 2014). 
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Gready (2014) argues that new ideas and disruptive ways of thinking are necessary to conceive 
adequate solutions to these challenges, and that disruptive ‘technologies’ will be necessary for their 
effective implementation. She suggests we need to reconceptualise the requirements for global food 
systems for the future, with a view to identifying best-fit options, especially for crop staples such as 
grains and legumes. Her focus is not merely to address the commonly perceived issue of ‘food 
security’, which represents public concerns and responsibilities of governments for food provision, 
but ‘food insecurity’ and its crippling impacts on people most at risk of being unable to obtain 
sufficient, affordable, safe and nutritious food reliably (Gready, 2014). 
We could choose to protect the ecological foundation of food security. Agricultural ecosystems are 
managed by humans largely to optimize provisioning ecosystem services, such as food, fibre and 
fuel, yet these benefits depend upon regulating ecosystem, for example pollination and pest 
regulation, from the wider landscape and environment for their long-term provision and 
sustainability (Poppy et al., 2014). This is the ecological foundation of food security (McKenzie & 
Ashton, 2012). At a local level, ecosystem services are crucial to the food security of many poor 
households. Every year, even in good years, households can still have days when they have no access 
to food. Food availability for many of the world's rural poor is particularly dependent on their being 
able to benefit from the flow of ecosystem services  from non-agricultural ecosystems, for example 
wild foods (Poppy et al., 2014). Such food stuffs do not appear in agricultural statistics as they are 
not traded commercially (Poppy et al., 2014). 
Despite being dependent on ecosystem services (or perhaps because of) agricultural landscapes 
continue to face major (Mueller et al., 2012). For decades now, we have watched on as landscapes 
around the world have experienced declines in regulating (eg. climate regulation, pollination, water 
purification) and supporting (eg. soil formation, nutrient cycling, primary production) ecosystem 
services (IAASTD, 2008; Trumper et al., 2009). The increased use of nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) 
fertilizers has had unintended consequences in water use, soil degradation, and chemical runoff, 
increased energy use and widespread pollution (Bouwman et al., 2013). Nearly 25 years ago, Chen 
(1990) and then Tilman (1998) described the intensification of agriculture has having broken what 
was once the tight, local recycling of nutrients on individual farms. These consequences are having 
impacts beyond the areas farmed and are widely recognized as a potential threat to the long-term 
sustainability and replication of the green revolutions’ success (Pingali, 2012).  
To protect the ecological foundation of agriculture, we could choose to act in the way that the world 
agreed in the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2000 (CBD, 2000) to:  
• Align incentives to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use 
• Manage ecosystems within the limits of their functioning 
• Adopt an integrated landscape approach to produce ecosystem services as well as 
agricultural products 
• Value ecosystem services by ensuring that well-functioning markets provide the right 
signals to reflect the scarcity value of natural resources 
Protecting the ecological foundation of agriculture requires protecting the land on which agriculture 
is already based. This would mean protecting existing agricultural land through land use planning 
that zones agro-ecological areas, protecting productive agricultural land from being concreted over 
for car parks, buildings and other non-agricultural uses. It would also mean reversing soil and water 
degradation. One of the biggest opportunities to sustainably produce more food is to restore the 
millions of hectares of degraded soils in existing agricultural areas (UNCCD, 2012). Another essential 
action is to better manage sources of rainwater and runoff for multifunctional agroecosystems at the 
catchment scale. There is also an urgent need for the regulation of groundwater aquifers to reduce 
 11 
 
unsustainable water withdrawals. Two-thirds of global water supplies for irrigation are drawn from 
underground aquifers at unsustainable rates (FAO, 2011). Any country using more than 20 percent 
of its renewable resources for irrigation is considered as crossing the threshold of impending water 
scarcity. There are already 22 countries (developing but including some in the Central Asia region) 
that have crossed this threshold. Large agricultural regions with unsustainable water withdrawal 
rates include eastern Australia, southern Spain, north Africa, the Great Plains of North America, 
northwestern India and northern China (Tweeten & Thompson, 2008; Godfray & Garnett, 2014). 
We could choose to focus on integrated farming systems. The way land is being used is changing 
changed, particularly in developed countries with a longer history of industrial agriculture. What 
were once mixed cropping and livestock systems in Western Europe and North America have 
increasingly become separate specialised enterprises since the middle of the twentieth century 
(Brown & Schulte, 2011; Kirkegaard et al., 2011). More recently in Australia, in the higher rainfall 
areas of the eastern and western wheat/sheep belts, there has already been a swing away from 
traditional mixed crop-livestock systems towards either crop or livestock systems (McKenzie, 2014). 
These trends towards land use specialisation can confound alternative visions for sustainable 
agriculture. Rather than moving into a more multifunctional or post-productivist modes of 
agriculture, production in many dryland agriculture areas is in fact becoming more intensified with 
fewer, not more, land uses (McKenzie, 2014). As developing country agriculture moves towards 
more intensive agricultural systems, greater homogenisation and the spread of monocultures is 
likely. Agricultural research and development has largely focused on single system component or 
single enterprises - neglecting the interaction between crops and livestock. What has resulted is a 
poor understanding of the complexities of inter-relationships between enterprises on mixed farms. 
Gaining a renewed appreciation of the benefits of multiple land uses for productivity will be an 
important means of not only moving towards a more sustainable agricultural sector, but ensuring 
that mixed farming systems survive (McKenzie, 2014).  
We could distribute phosphorus more equitably and efficiently. Scarcities in phosphorus supplies 
and constraints in accessibility are likely to lead to marked rises in the cost of phosphorus 
(Obersteiner et al., 2013). On the one hand, it will become increasingly economical to mobilise 
previously unaccessed reserves, which are probably currently underestimated (Godfray & Garnett, 
2014). On the other hand, this would see phosphorus become economically inaccessible to low-
income and food-deficient countries. Continuation of business as usual would favour the short-term 
interests of those able to pay for high-priced fertilizers, exacerbating food crises and agricultural 
expansion in the short-term (Obersteiner et al., 2013). Low-income food-deficient countries, many 
of which are now endowed with phosphorus-deficient soils, often as a result of unsustainable 
management practices, will want to see inequalities in access to phosphorus supplies addressed 
(Obersteiner et al., 2013). Obersteiner et al. (2013) are pessimistic about this likelihood. They 
contend that the interests of rich phosphorus consumers, poor and food-insecure phosphorus 
consumers, and phosphorus producers are, to a large degree, conflicting - with competing interests 
in the longevity, equitability and cost of phosphorus supplies (Obersteiner et al., 2013). They note 
that wealthy phosphorus consumers are already using their political and economic weight to secure 
future supplies from phosphorus producers. The suggest the divergent agendas of these three 
groups of nations render a sustainable management regime of finite phosphorus resources almost 
impossible (Obersteiner et al., 2013). 
We could choose to avoid dangerous climate change. In the next two decades, climate change is 
predicted to cause major crop losses in the world’s poorest regions (Kiers et al., 2008). According to 
the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, all aspects of food security are potentially affected by climate 
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change, including food access, utilization, and price stability (Porter et al., 2014). Elevated CO2 
already has the potential to negatively affect nutritional quality of food and fodder, including protein 
and micronutrients (Porter et al., 2014). While agriculture will be adversely impacted by climate 
changeit it is also well recognised food production is also a major contributor the emissions that 
drive climate change. Bajželj,et al., (2014) draw attention to the imperative to find ways to achieve 
global food security without expanding crop or pastureland and without increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Many authors have emphasized a role for sustainable intensification of Agriculture in 
closing global ‘yield gaps’ between the currently realized and potentially achievable yields. However, 
Bajzeli et al., (2014) show in their analysis that even if yield gaps are closed, the projected demand 
will drive further agricultural expansion. They argue there has to be a reduction in demand. Although 
it is theoretically possible to decarbonize energy supply, such complete reductions are unattainable 
in the livestock part of the agricultural sector. Their work indicates that a decrease in overall 
agriculture-related emissions can only be achieved by employing demand-side reductions. Reducing 
emissions from agriculture is essential to reduce the risks of dangerous climate change. Bajzeli, et al., 
(2014) conclude that while agricultural production must strive to improve yields and food 
distribution, improved diets and reductions in food waste are also essential to deliver emissions 
reductions, and to provide enough food for the global population of 2050. 
We can choose how to invest. From an economic point of view, it has been estimated that 
cumulative gross investment requirements for developing countries’ agriculture is approximately 
US$9.2 trillion for the 44 years from 2006 – 2050 (Schmidhuber et al., 2009). Of this total, 
investments in primary agriculture would account for about US$5.2 trillion, while the remaining 
US$4.0 trillion would be absorbed by downstream needs (processing, transportation, storage, etc.).  
Within primary agriculture, mechanisation and improvements to irrigation would be the single 
biggest investment items. The average annual spend would be approximately US$210 billion gross 
and US$83 billion net, respectively. US$210 billion is the projected size of the agricultural products 
market in 2020 (TEEB, 2010). As Schmidhuber et al. (2009) note, these estimates have nothing to do 
with achieving Millenium Development Goals or any sustainability agenda. They are simply cost 
estimates for achieving the levels of crop and livestock production that the FAO has forecast as 
baseline levels through to 2030 and 2050. Nor do such estimates take in to account the potential 
cost implications of reforms to trading rules and market access.  Assuming US$210 billion was 
required each year, how much should come from the public and private sectors? In a World Bank 
report on land acquisitions, Deininger et al (2011) suggested that the rediscovery of investment in 
the agricultural sector could be an opportunity for land abundant countries to gain better 
technology and create rural jobs. However, if managed improperly, it could result in “conflict, 
environmental damage, and a resource curse” (p. xvx). We could make strategic decision about how 
to manage the interlinkages and trade-offs between different investment decisions.  
We could choose to limit consumption. Decision makers are reluctant to wade in to question of 
limiting consumption or to tackle the global convergence to a western diet (Stokstad, 2010). Yet, we 
live in a world where under and over-nutrition are impacting seriously on human health, side by side 
in the same countries. If diets were changed and if waste in the food system were reduced, then not 
only could we feed the world on existing agricultural land, but it might also be possible to reduce 
inputs and the environmental damage current food production causes. Radical choices would need 
to be made for this to happen (Godfray & Garnett, 2014). Evidence indicates this now must receive 
attention and that improved diets and decreases in food waste are essential to deliver emissions 
reductions and to provide global food security in 2050 (Bajželj et al., 2014).  This would not just 
mean improving storage for crops (via small metal silos, hermetically sealed plastic storage bags and 
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plastic crates) but potentially also policies to change food date labels to reduce consumer confusion 
about when food is no longer sage to eat (Lipinski et al., 2013).  
We could focus on alternative sources of energy for agricultural intensification. It is well recognised 
that modern agriculture was built on cheap fossil fuels to power not only on-farm operation, 
transport to and from farm of supplies and products, but more importantly, the embodied energy in 
fertiliser and to less extent pesticides (Steinbuks & Hertel, 2013). A bag of synthetic nitrogen is a bag 
of energy. We overlook this at our peril. Utz (2011) provides a useful examination of energy in 
modern agriculture operated by smallholder farmers in the developed world. There are two main 
energy requirements for greater agricultural productivity in a market-oriented agriculture, provided 
by either renewable or conventional energy sources or a combination of both: energy for transport 
(fossil fuels or biofuels) for many services within the supply chain; and energy for production and 
processing. We need to be creative in how this energy is produced.  
We could encourage more resilient and equitable trade regimes.  Trade plays a crucial role in 
allowing societies in conditions of food deficit to meet their demand through imports from other 
regions of the world. The amount of food calories traded in the international market more than 
doubled between 1986 and 2009, while the number of links in the trade network increased by more 
than 50% (D'Odorico et al., 2014). This still only adds up to about 23% of total food produced for 
human consumption being traded internationally (D'Odorico et al., 2014). Still, the fact that about 
one quarter of all food is traded suggest that global food security can be threatened not only by 
regional climate extremes (drought, flood, frost) but also by price volatility and changes in the food 
market (Headley, 2010; D'Odorico et al., 2014). Almost 50% of the net exports are contributed by 
only 5 countries: United States; Brazil; Argentina; Indonesia; and France (D'Odorico et al., 2014). 
Countries that strongly rely on trade are expected to be particularly vulnerable, especially if their 
economies are not strong enough to absorb the shocks of food price volatility in the global market 
(FAO-OECD, 2011; D'Odorico et al., 2014). The urban poor in least developed countries are much 
more exposed to global food market prices than the rural poor. This is crucial given that many urban 
areas are now dependent on globalised food production and distribution networks, with a supply of 
food and water that would support their population for several days at most in an emergency 
(Pelletier et al., 2011). As urbanization increases, so does the likelihood that food price increases and 
fluctuations lead to political and social instability (Godfray & Garnett, 2014).  
Many argue that the global trading system itself needs to be redesigned to maintain the economic 
viability of agriculture as well as environmental sustainability (Kissinger and Rees, 2009). There have 
been call for more diversified international supply chains with reduced reliance on a small number of 
agro-companies, for reformed international trade policies that are supportive of ecological 
agriculture, and for improved market access for developing country producers. Yet suggestions on 
exactly how to realistically achieve this are not easy to find nor are many decision makers willing to 
take on this particular political dynamite. In recent years, negotiations over market access and 
domestic support have not gone well and it is not likely that issues of free trade in relation to 
environmental and social sustainability will be addressed in the near future (Dibden et al., 2009).  
We could choose to support smallholders and agriculture for development.  Agriculture at a global 
scale is an important source of food. At the local and national scales, particularly in developing and 
emerging countries, it is also an important source of income and economic growth (Pingali, 2012). 
The choice to promote agriculture as a development pathway has been made by many nations, 
development agencies and organisations. However, agriculture for development does not 
necessarily have the same objectives as agriculture for food security. Indeed, food scarcity can be of 
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greater economic benefit where producers can earn more from higher prices. If the choice is made 
to promote agriculture for development, this needs to be reconciled with alternative goals of food 
security and sustainability. Growing more food doesn’t necessarily mean a better livelihood for 
farmers. Sustainable food production does not necessarily mean sustaining farmer’s livelihoods or 
even farming communities.  
Likewise, the industrialisation of agriculture doesn’t necessarily mean a better life for smallholders 
either. As Gimenez and Altieri (2013) suggest, the expansion of industrial agriculture and the 
formalisation of associate markets for seed, land and other inputs has the potential to destroy the 
livelihoods of many smallholders. According to the FAO, agricultural growth involving smallholders, 
especially women, will be most effective in reducing extreme poverty and hunger when it increases 
returns to labour and generates employment for the poor (FAO et al., 2012). This may mean 
choosing a pathway that avoids greater mechanisation of agriculture. Or it could mean promoting 
diversified rural economies and markets and alternative opportunities for rural employment outside 
agriculture. Positive results can come from policies that support micro-enterprise development, 
which reduces reliance on land and provides alternative livelihoods that require less space (Muriuki 
et al., 2010).  
Lastly, we need to pay attention to the marginal environments where many smallholders are 
located.  Technologies in the Green Revolution period did not focus on the constraints to production 
in more marginal environments, especially tolerance to stresses such as drought or flooding. More 
often than not, marginal environments were left behind, because the climate and resource 
constraints were such that returns to investment in green revolution varieties were low (Pingali, 
2012). In Sub-Saharan Africa, if grown under the conditions typical of smallholder cultivation, high 
yielding varieties would often yield less than the traditional farmer varieties (Sayer & Cassman, 
2013). Greater attention needs to be paid to the production challenges of agricultural in marginal 
and degraded areas. 
We could choose a different paradigm. We could shift from our current paradigm of productivity 
enhancement while reducing environmental impacts, to a paradigm where ecological sustainability 
constitutes the entry point for all agricultural development. If we embraced this new paradigm, 
sustainable governance and management of ecosystems, natural resources and earth system 
processes at large, would provide the basis for practical solutions towards an intensification of 
agriculture to deliver the huge increase in food production required by a global population of nine 
billion. Such a paradigm could reposition world agriculture from its current role as the world’s single 
largest driver of global environmental change, to becoming a critical part of a world transition to a 
safe operating space on our planet (Rockström et al., 2009; Rockström et al., 2010). This is our 
choice to make.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have options in how we go about meeting the food security challenge. There are serious choices 
facing humanity that we haven’t even begun to properly debate or address. Questions about the 
choices that we face in coming decades – value judgements that must be faced and cannot be 
avoided by expecting physical limits to intensification within the safe operating space of the planet 
to constrain our behaviour.  As is made clear by current and emerging trends, the visions of a 
sustainable or green agriculture are a long way from the trajectory that food and agricultural 
systems are on. Around the world, there is growing recognition of the importance of sustainability 
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and the need to take immediate and sustained action to transform our agricultural and food systems 
is an imperative, particularly in the face of climate change. We have choices in how we go about 
producing food – choices that we need to face up to instead of waiting for limits to be imposed by 
nature, or crises to knock some sense in to us. Neither will come soon enough. If the world decided 
it was ready to take serious action, what would be required? Social, environmental and economic 
considerations come in to play. Issues of livelihoods, rural development and health are central. 
There is no right answer. There are many answers, many possible scenarios and many system inter-
linkages to consider. We need to move forward.  
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